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Abstract  
 
Scholars engaged in debates about the use of public reason often view religious arguments as 
being out of bounds. Yet the real-world impact of religious discourse remains under-
explored. This study contributes to research in this area with an empirical test looking at the 
impact of religious arguments on a particular policy debate. A survey experiment explored 
the effects of religious and secular cues with varied policy directions on the issue of assisted 
dying. The findings showed that secular arguments were considerably more likely to elicit a 
positive response, and that, while religious arguments were not a conversation stopper, they 
produced significant distortions in political perceptions among participants, though not 
necessarily along the identity lines critical to the public reason debate.  
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Discourse plays a critical role in the conduct of political life. Two of the most 
prominent forms of discourse – religious and secular – have received considerable attention 
from political theorists, most notably in the long-running debate about the promise of 
political liberalism and the role of religion in the public square. Although the specific logic of 
this debate is important to examine, the philosophical merits of the arguments involved often 
hinge on certain assumptions about the effect that religious and secular discourses might have 
on the general public. However, to date these assumptions have passed largely unexamined. 
Is it true that religious arguments constitute, as Rorty (2003) would say, a ‘conversation 
stopper’? Or are religious justifications interchangeable with secular reasons? 
To contribute to this on-going debate, we engage experimental evidence with 
treatments situated on the issue of assisted dying in the UK. The results show that religious 
and secular discourses have a variety of important political effects, including an impact on 
the willingness of participants to engage with, and vote for, prospective candidates for public 
office. These findings suggest that religious reasons are not necessarily conversation 
stoppers, but neither are they wholly interchangeable with secular justifications. Rather, the 
use of religious reasons produces significant distortions in political perceptions among 
members of the public, with the result that secular arguments are considerably more likely to 
elicit a positive response. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we set out an overview of the respective 
literatures on the issue of religious justifications in public debate. Second, we explain the 
methodology of the experiment, and, third, we report on the results of the survey experiment 
and discuss some of the possible implications. 
  
The Discourse of Religious Actors  
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Religious actors seek to influence public policy issues using a wide variety of 
methods. Like other organized interests, the range of strategies employed in this endeavour 
includes the lobbying of elected officials, utilising links to political figures and institutions, 
participation in protests, promoting campaigns, mobilising their memberships and engaging 
in numerous forms of political debate. The use of discourse is central to these activities, 
providing one of the key means by which religious actors attempt to persuade wider publics 
as to the merits of a specific position, as well as to challenge and delegitimise points of view 
that differ from their own (see Hofrenning 1995; Knutson 2013). 
Academic research into the way in which religious actors engage in the use of 
discourse covers a diversity of themes. Examples of the breadth of coverage here, include: 
religious and secular discourse in Islamic societies (An-Na’im 2005; Pfeifer 2019), Islamist 
discourses on human rights (Carle 2005), conflicts over evolutionary theory (Silva 2018), the 
discourse of Buddhist nationalist groups (Walton and Jerryson 2016), the discourse of South 
Korean evangelical Christians (Yi et al 2017), religion in Swedish public discourse (Lövheim 
and Axner 2011), abortion discourse in Singapore (Tan 2010), the use of religious discourse 
on the Internet (Karaflogka 2002), the rhetoric of the U.S. Christian Right (Jelen 2005; 
Wilson and Djupe 2020), the discourse of conservative Christian groups in the UK (Kettell 
2016a, 2016b), as well as religious discourse on sexual rights (Hunt 2010; Thomas and Olson 
2012), assisted dying, and same-sex marriage (Djupe, Lewis, and Jelen 2016; Kettell 2018).  
While fair procedures are an important part of the policy making process, political 
theorists also point to the importance of engaging in accessible means of justification for 
policy positions. Many scholars argue that societies containing a plurality of often 
irreconcilable worldviews require a common language that all reasonable citizens can use in 
order to meaningfully take part in democratic deliberation (Rawls 1971). According to this 
viewpoint, comprehensive doctrines, including some ideological frameworks and religious 
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propositions, are said to be unintelligible to citizens who do not subscribe to their 
foundational tenets, meaning that a discursive framework held in common (often described as 
‘public reason’) is required to ensure that laws can be justified in terms that citizens can 
understand and accept (for discussions see Ciszewski 2016; Habermas 2006; Laborde 2013; 
Quong 2004; Rorty 2003; Sajo 2009).  
Critics of this public reason criterion have challenged what they see as the illiberal 
and undemocratic implications of a conceptual framework that seems designed to exclude 
religious views from the public square (e.g., Perry 2001; Maclure 2006; Chaplin 2009). 
Moreover, its parameters remain open to question. Opinions differ as to whether it should 
apply to all levels of society (e.g., Quong 2004) or be restricted to elites in the process of 
legislative decision-making (Rawls 1971; Habermas 2006; North 2012), whether it should 
govern underlying motivations for policy choices in addition to their public justifications (see 
Audi 2000; Sajo 2009; Ciszewski 2016), and whether the public and private spheres can be 
conceptually distinguished from each other in the way that supporters of public reason 
suggest (Bader 2009). The criteria for deciding what qualifies as a ‘religious’ and a ‘secular’ 
argument is also up for debate (see Audi 2000; Carter 1993). 
Despite the claims made in these theoretical discussions, empirical research has found 
little evidence that religious leaders actually use theological rhetoric when engaging in public 
debate. Indeed, a number of studies have suggested that religious actors engaging in high-
profile political deliberations have sought to downplay overtly religious arguments in favour 
of a discourse grounded in secular language (see Beyerlein and Eberle 2014; Graham 2013; 
Hunt 2014; Jelen 2005; Kettell 2018, 2019; Thomas 2014). This is said to provide a more 
effective means of framing viewpoints and policy positions and of making those arguments 
potentially more accessible to a wider audience. Such an approach is thought to be especially 
valuable in societies that have experienced processes of secularisation, where religious 
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language may not be well understood nor regarded as a legitimate form of reasoning by large 
sections of the general public. 
 
Experimental Contributions 
One venue where the reaction to religious and secular rhetoric has been tested head to 
head is in experimental contexts. These tests were not composed for the purposes of 
adjudicating debates over public reason, but the results are relevant in that they help us build 
expectations for how religious rhetoric may be received. Although there are many contexts in 
which religious communication takes place (for comprehensive reviews see Djupe and 
Calfano 2019; Djupe and Smith 2019; Knoll and Bolin 2019), we focus on the most relevant 
context to the public reason debate – issue communication from public officials (or 
candidates). As noted above, this is the context where many agree that the use of public 
reason nears the level of moral (although not legal) requirement. 
The simplest and oldest line of experimentation has concentrated on the most negative 
possibility – namely, that people will not vote for a religious minority representing a party 
that they would otherwise support. The results on this are mixed, changing across time and by 
the group being examined, but are limited since all of it is situated in the US. For instance, 
one study found little bias in Florida against a Jewish candidate running to be vice president 
in 2000 (Kane et al. 2004), and another found that Republican anger against Mitt Romney’s 
candidacy could be mitigated by more inclusive messages from religious elites (Calfano et al. 
2013b). A study using a list experiment by Benson et al. (2011) however, found substantial 
bias against atheists and Muslims running for office.  
Although there is very little evidence to suggest that majority religious affiliation 
reduces support in the US – as majority religious identity tends to signal trustworthiness (e.g., 
Boas 2014, 2016; McDermott 2009; Weber and Thornton 2012) – research has also found 
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that cues and rhetoric signalling a particular faith or religiosity tend to be divisive. “Prayerful 
consideration” as a decision-making process to run for office has been found to appeal to 
religious voters, but less to secular2 ones (McLaughlin and Wise 2014). Signalling religiosity 
by a candidate through church attendance has the same effect – dividing the electorate on 
secular-religious lines (Castle et al. 2017) – although there are ways in which candidates can 
send coded “God talk” cues to religious voters without alienating secular voters (Calfano and 
Djupe 2009). Berinsky and Mendelberg (2010) show that exposure to discredited stereotypes 
of Jews helped voters see the candidate as liberal (another Jewish stereotype in the US). 
Nevertheless, whether using coded or overt cues, each cue effect hinges on available 
stereotypes, suggesting that religious cue effects are operating on a surface, heuristic level.  
However, there is also evidence that people consume religious rhetoric and think 
through the implications. The most typical is situated in the ingroup – some denominational 
religious leaders were found to be able to influence the immigration attitudes of members 
(Wallsten and Nteta 2016). But outside of the ingroup, research has also found that the use of 
a religious decision-making process grants credibility and trust to religious actors (though not 
universally), leading to greater adoption of their arguments (Djupe and Calfano 2009). 
Similarly, Djupe et al. (2016) found that a religious leader offering a religious justification for 
denying services to LGBT citizens was granted greater credibility and tolerance by people 
outside of that religious tradition. Americans are simply not much averse to hearing “god 
talk”, though the non-religious are slightly more averse than others, suggesting that some 
populations embrace free speech norms and their right not to be persuaded by it (Evans 
2018). 
 
2 This is a complicated term since it is possible to be religious and use secular language at the same time. Here, 
by secular, we mean that the group did not identify with a religious group in a survey. 
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The final way in which religious cues influence voting behaviour is through identity 
effects (for a comprehensive review, see Miles 2019). Though this literature is quite vast and 
varied, perhaps the most relevant parts are consistent with a heuristic, social perception 
approach. Group conflict, real or imagined, triggers positive ingroup feelings and trust as well 
as negative outgroup feelings and distrust (e.g., Gervais et al. 2011; Jelen 1993; McDermott 
2009). More specifically, individuals in the US draw on ideological identity labels to fuel 
affective polarization without underlying policy coherence (Mason 2018). That dynamic is 
not unique to the US, of course; voters in the UK demonstrate a link between their religion 
and party support despite heterogeneous demography and issue positions (Tilley 2014). In 
this way, identity cues may generate negative, out-group sentiments regardless of shared 
political positions. 
While identity shapes how individuals see others, that is not the only way in which 
identity plays a role. In addition, group identity shapes how individuals are seen by society. 
Groups may develop reputations – such as pious, strong, conservative, or untouchable – in 
part through social roles that help the reputation spread throughout society (e.g., Ross, 
Amabile, and Steinmetz 1977). Upon repeated interactions approached on the bases of those 
biases, error-prone stereotypes may harden into reality (e.g., Snyder and Swann 1978). As 
noted above, researchers have observed some of these patterns with respect to religious 
politicians, who have historically gained trust (e.g., McDermott 2009) and conservative 
credentials (Calfano and Djupe 2009) as a result.  
Further explorations are warranted, in part because of the ramifications posed by 
identity effects of these kinds for the public reason debate. In one understanding, identity-
based evaluation of candidates is a further layer exacerbating religious divides, precluding 
debate and not just stopping it once invoked. But the social perception perspective has a 
different implication. Public reason is concerned with divides between groups that end 
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democratic processes, but social perception biases are often shared by people across those 
divides. Therefore, people who share biases are reasoning together based on shared, if flawed 
grounds and pose no threat to democratic processes. 
   
The Assisted Dying Debate 
This paper contributes directly to these debates by empirically testing the 
effectiveness of religious and secular forms of language centred on the issue of assisted 
dying. This is a controversial practice that enables terminally ill patients (normally with fewer 
than two years to live) to end their own lives with the aid of a qualified physician or carer. It 
is an issue that goes to the heart of debates about the relationship between medical 
technologies, science, and the state. The topic also highlights the political effects of 
religiosity. Studies have consistently found that people who frequently attend a place of 
worship, who profess a strong belief in God, and who consider religion to be important in 
their lives are less likely to express support for assisted dying compared to those who are less 
or not religious (Verbakel and Jaspers 2010; Sharp 2016). These findings are mirrored in the 
UK, where assisted dying remains illegal despite high levels of public support. Although a 
majority of religious citizens approve of legalisation (with attitudes having become 
increasingly liberal since the 1970s), they tend to be less supportive than citizens who have 
fewer or no religious convictions (Clements 2014; NatCen 2019). The majority of religious 
organisations (with a few notable exceptions) remain strongly opposed (Kettell 2019). 
Despite this, public debate on assisted dying in the UK has been conducted in largely 
secular terms. While religious actors in support of legalisation have deployed theological 
arguments emphasising the need for compassion in the face of unnecessary suffering, and 
while (the more numerous) religious opponents have maintained that killing is prohibited by 
scripture and that life is a gift from God (and therefore not within the purview of individuals 
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to dispense with as they please), the prevailing discourse has mostly fulfilled the public 
reason criterion. Campaigners in favour of legalisation have typically based their case on 
arguments grounded in the secular principles of personal autonomy (i.e., the right of 
individual citizens to live and die in dignity according to their own ethical values) and a 
humanitarian desire to avoid unbearable and unnecessary suffering, especially given the 
futility of prolonging medical treatment for an individual who no longer considers their life to 
be worthwhile. Most religious opponents of assisted dying have framed their objections in a 
similar way. The principal arguments here include claims that legalisation would put 
vulnerable groups of people at risk (such as the elderly and the infirm), that the greater need 
is for more resources to be put into palliative care, that legalisation would create irresistible 
pressures to expand the right to die to an ever-wider range of cases (such as mental illness 
and other non-terminal conditions), and that changing the law would damage doctor-patient 
relations (on these points see Verbakel and Jaspers 2010; Kettell 2019). 
 
Hypotheses 
The public reason debate concerns the conditions that enable all members of society 
to accept the results of the democratic process. If this is couched in a language that they can 
understand and uses arguments that they can accept, then the citizenry is more likely to view 
the outcome as legitimate. As such, the most optimistic expectation for the reaction to 
religious cues in a religiously plural democracy is that they are widely translatable. For 
instance, people will understand that ‘sin’ is equivalent to ‘wrongdoing’. Secular arguments 
will have the same effect as religious arguments, capturing widely held values to which 
society adheres. We express this as Hypothesis #1: Religious cues will have no significant 
impact on citizen views about public policy arguments and/or the actor presenting them.  
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The studies discussed above, however, are not so sanguine about the way in which 
religious and secular arguments may be received. They suggest two primary ways in which 
religious rhetoric may intervene in policy debates. In many societies, religious cues 
accompany strong stereotypes that individuals rely on to make decisions. In the US, for 
instance, the active stereotype is that religious actors are conservative (e.g. Castle et al. 2017; 
Djupe and Calfano 2009). This heuristic judgment may substitute for processing other 
available information and, in effect, stop conversation. That is, even if the religious actor is 
making a liberal policy argument, the fact that they provide religious cues may send the 
signal that they are more conservative. Therefore, Hypothesis #2 is that religious cue-givers 
will be seen as more conservative, regardless of their policy positions. 
Two other features of this expectation are notable. First, this heuristic may be widely 
available and thus may exert sample-level effects – i.e., everyone, on average, may show 
evidence of this bias. Even though heuristic reliance may distort a policy debate, if it does not 
distort it unevenly between groups, then arguably the public is reasoning similarly. In this 
way, public reason requirements are not abridged since groups who do not share the religious 
or ideological ethos can understand and accept the message similarly to those who do.  
An alternate role that religious rhetoric may play is by triggering between-group 
identity effects. If secular citizens see evidence of religion attached to a policy position, they 
may reject it as the outgroup, despite evidence that they share a political affiliation or stance 
(e.g., Evans 2018; Mason 2018; Tilley 2014). This hypothesis is the principal worry from a 
public reason perspective. The same may not be true for religious citizens, since secular 
information is not the same as anti-religious information. Instead, secular arguments are most 
often seen as areligious arguments that could be produced by a religious or irreligious source. 
In this way, Hypothesis #3 is that the effects of religious rhetoric should be more pronounced 
for secular than religious participants. 
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Methodology 
The test for this study involved a survey with an embedded experiment modelled on a 
version of a questionnaire used in Calfano, Djupe, and Wilson (2013a). Participation was 
entirely voluntary, and all responses were anonymous.3 The experiment was a simple 2x2 
design that varied: 1) support and opposition to an assisted dying policy, and 2) whether the 
supporting argument was secular or religious. The composition of the treatment led with a 
generic image of a fictitious candidate for Parliament – a white woman called ‘Leslie Smith’ 
who was described as being married, aged 45, and working as a consultant. This description 
was followed by an expression of her view on the legalisation of assisted dying for terminally 
ill patients with fewer than six months to live. This view consisted of one of four randomly 
allocated statements that were designed to capture the differing religious and secular 
positions outlined above. For naturalism, the arguments contained in these statements were 
taken directly from public debates on the issue. These statements were:  
1. Religious, opposing: “Human beings are made in God’s image. Life is the greatest gift 
from God. This prohibits the deliberate ending of a human life, including our own. 
Legalisation would be sinful.”  
2. Secular, opposing: “Research from around the world shows that legalisation would 
endanger the most vulnerable in our society, break the relationship of trust that exists 
between patients and doctors, and create pressures to expand the right to die to an 
ever-wider range of cases.”  
 
3 This project was reviewed and approved by the Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Committee at 
the University of Warwick. 
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3. Religious, supporting: “God calls on us to show compassion. The golden rule of any 
religion is to help all those in need. Legalisation would put these ethics into practice. I 
believe that it would be sinful to oppose a measure that can reduce human suffering.”  
4. Secular, supporting: “Legalisation gives people greater autonomy over their own lives 
and reduces human suffering. Safeguards ensure that the most vulnerable members of 
society are protected. Research from around the world shows that legalisation 
produces no adverse social effects.”  
 
Participants were then asked a series of questions about Leslie Smith’s qualities as a 
candidate, including her perceived political orientation (left-right), her degree of religiosity, 
the extent to which she was considered to be an advocate for personal responsibility, and 
whether or not participants would consider taking advice from her.4 These constitute the 
primary dependent variables in this study.  
We pursue two analytical strategies. First, we look to see whether the treatments 
produced sample-level differences in perceptions of and support for the candidate. By 
evaluating the perceived ideology and religiosity of the candidate, we can determine whether 
religious and secular rhetoric are interchangeable for each policy position. Second, we also 
assess the possibility that religious and secular participants see the world differently. This 
entails testing the effects of the treatments, conditional on the religious/secular identity of the 
participant. As will be seen, the first aim is accomplished by showing the interactions, so in 
the name of efficiency we only present the interaction results. 
The sample was composed of responses from 332 participants in an introductory 
Politics class at the University of Warwick, with the experiment conducted during the final 
(exam revision) lecture to maximize participation. The concern for all samples used in 
 
4 We also examined whether participants would vote for the candidate, the results of which are in the Appendix.  
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experimentation is external validity – can results found with “college sophomores in the lab” 
(Sears 1986) add to scientific literatures as being suggestive of how representative 
populations would react? The discussion of student samples has focused on whether there is 
crucial variation in the sample, whether the sample looks like the population, and whether 
students respond like adults. Students have been found, for instance, to have identities that 
are less stable, belong to social networks that are in flux, have weaker attitudes, possess 
greater compliance with authority figures and stronger cognitive skills. In addition, they tend 
to be less religious and less political than the average adult (on these points see, e.g. 
Druckman and Kam 2011; Kam, Wilking, and Zechmeister 2007; Sears 1986).  
These concerns are largely alleviated by the composition of the sample. The sample 
was split nearly evenly by gender (54% women), was majority white (66%), moderate on 
average (2.7 on a 5 point scale), politically interested (3.1 on a 1-4 scale), and not very 
religious (averaging just below ‘several times a year’ for attendance at a place of worship). 
These statistics and scale notations are shown in the Appendix (Table A1). This helps to 
confirm that there is variation in the sample. It is more non-white than the UK as a whole 
(being 87% white, according to the 2011 census), and, critically, it is roughly as non-religious 
as the British public – 55% of the sample claims the identity “None, nothing, secular” 
compared to 52% found by the 2019 British Social Attitudes Survey (NatCen 2019). 
Alongside this, Druckman and Kam (2011) provide evidence that student samples can 
respond in similar ways to adult samples on most types of questions, those with both 
homogeneous (the same across the population) as well as heterogeneous treatment effects. 
That said, the usual caution should be employed – this is only one study with a sample of 
limited scope.  
The other element of external validity concerns whether the treatment-participant 
interaction is plausible. If experiments address how the world could be, then a critical 
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question is whether participants could reasonably be exposed to the rhetoric we employ.  
Alongside the ongoing debate over assisted dying that we discussed above, recent years have 
seen the emergence in the UK of high-profile political tensions over issues such as the 
legalisation of same-sex marriage and cases of alleged employment discrimination on 
religious grounds, several of which were ultimately resolved only by the European Court of 
Human Rights. In this context, participants in the survey were likely to have been exposed to 
both religious and secular forms of argumentation and were therefore reasonably well-placed 
to respond to them.  
The number of surveys returned varied somewhat by treatment, as one cell (secular, 
opposed) was returned by fewer participants (64) compared to the others (87, 87, 94). 
However, this treatment group did not stand out from the others in terms of its demographic 
composition. On two of three measures, the sample was effectively randomized. There were 
no significant deviations across treatments on gender (ANOVA p=.80) and pre-university 
attendance at a place of worship (p=.88). There was significant variation on race and ethnicity 
(p<.01), with white proportions ranging from .53 to .77. Therefore, the analyses employ 
models to assess treatment effects which control for these variables to help adjust for 
treatment composition variation. Tables with full model results are available in the Appendix 
in Table A2. We focus on figures of the effects of interest – interactions of religious/secular 
respondents with the treatments – in the text.  
In each figure, we translate statistical tests into the equivalent visual representations of 
uncertainty. That is, while it is commonplace to simply use 95 percent confidence intervals 
on all visuals, comparison of multiple 95 percent intervals is a much more restrictive test than 
assessing whether a mean difference is different from zero with 95 percent confidence; it is 
actually equivalent to a p<.01 test (Knol, Pestman, and Grobbee 2011). Multiple sources 
recommend translating statistical tests into confidence intervals that mimic the desired test – 
15 
 
the non-overlap of two 84 percent confidence intervals is the equivalent of a single 95 percent 
test of significance, such as a t-test (Goldstein and Healy 1995; Knol et al. 2011; MacGregor-
Fors and Payton 2013; Payton, Greenstone, and Schenker 2003).   
One final potential issue is the well-known ‘WEIRD problem’ – namely that much 
scholarly research tends to use participants drawn from countries that are Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (Henrich et al 2010), reducing the extent to which their 
findings can be generalised to wider (‘non-WEIRD’) populations. In this particular case, 
given that the central terms of the debate about the value of religion and public reason refer to 
WEIRD countries (particularly in the United States and Western Europe), we did not consider 
this issue to pose any special difficulties.  
 
Results – Religiosity 
The survey asked participants how religious they thought the candidate was, which 
could be a straightforward exercise of seeing religious cues in play and attributing them to the 
candidate. The simple expectation is therefore that the two conditions with religious cues, 
regardless of position, would be viewed as more religious. However, the results in Figure 1 
show something slightly different. It is clear that participants factored in the stance of the 
candidate – those candidates against assisted dying were viewed as being more religious than 
those in support of legalisation. And that is true for both secular and religiously identified 
participants. There is one significant difference between secular and religious people within 
the treatments (on the religiosity of the oppose, secular candidate), but the overall pattern is 
the same. Within each stance, the religious cue-giver is seen as having greater religiosity, 
though it is almost superfluous for the candidates opposed to assisted dying.  
 
Figure 1 – How Perceptions of the Religiosity of an Elected Official Shift with Secular 
and Religious Arguments Depending on Stance and Religious Identity.  
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Apparently, a conservative stance on what might be termed a moral issue is de facto 
sending a clear religious signal. That is unexpected when taking a liberal position, so the 
addition of the religious cue improves their perceived religious identity, though it is still less 
than what is ascribed to the candidates that oppose assisted dying. Another way to view the 
results, though, is as a reflection of the extent to which religion is well integrated into the 
political life of the UK (e.g., Tilley 2014), such that adding a religious argument does not 
shift perceptions appreciably, especially on the conservative side. This is not the pattern of 
religion as a conversation stopper.  
 
Results – Ideology 
Figure 2 shows the same analysis, but with the perceived political ideology of the 
candidate as the dependent variable. Simple expectations are that candidates opposed to 
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assisted dying would be seen as conservative (right wing), while those in support would be 
seen as liberal (left wing). The results, however, suggest some interplay with religious 
rhetoric. Those candidates using religious rhetoric are seen as being more conservative, 
regardless of their position. That is, the candidate in support of assisted dying but using 
religious language is seen as more conservative than the candidate opposed to the policy and 
using secular language. Still, the issue position does have an impact – among the candidates 
using religious rhetoric, those opposed are seen as more conservative.  
In this case, it is surprising to note that the observed pattern is not a function of the 
religious identity of the participant – these are sample-level effects. Religious participants 
have the same view of these candidates as their secular counterparts. Again, this is not a 
pattern we would expect if religion were a conversation stopper. Religion appears quite well 
integrated into public policy decisions, especially on the right. That, of course, poses a 
problem because religious rhetoric is stereotyped as conservative even when it is justifying 
more liberal positions. In this way, it could be argued that religion is more of a thinking 
stopper, because it provides such a powerful heuristic for conservatism.  
 
Figure 2 - How Perceptions of the Ideology of an Elected Official Shift with Secular and 
Religious Arguments Depending on Stance and Participant Religious Identification 
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Results – Personal Responsibility  
In order to assess what participants meant by identifying the candidates as being right 
or left wing we asked them to assess the extent to which the candidate backed a politics of 
personal responsibility. To us, this signalled that the candidate would be concerned with the 
individual and individual choices. This might be juxtaposed with a communitarian concern 
for community standards and the health of the group. Religious groups vary on this 
dimension, of course, but religion has often been associated with pressing moral standards 
that are intended to impinge on particular individuals more than others. The treatments do not 
draw a bright line on this score, but the religious, support condition emphasizes the 
individual in its rhetoric, which leads us to suspect that the legalisation side would be seen as 
more individual-oriented and the opposing side would be seen as less so.  
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Figure 3 shows the results that accord with the stereotype of religion as 
communitarian. Here, both religious rhetoric conditions are seen as being less focused on 
individual responsibility, while the secular condition candidates are seen as being more 
focused on it. Religious cue-giving candidates are seen uniformly – religious rhetoric 
candidates are indistinguishable from each other by both religious and secular participants. 
The secular rhetoric candidates show more variation. In particular, secular participants see the 
secular, support candidate as distinguishably more focused on personal responsibility. 
Religious participants show a pattern suggestive of that same distinction, but that difference 
is not statistically significant.  
One possible reason for these findings is that religious rhetoric does not lend itself 
well to expressions of individual rights, though there is ample evidence to suggest otherwise. 
Thus, even when religious language was used to support the legalisation of assisted dying 
respondents may have felt as though the candidate was doing this with recourse to 
communitarian reasons and concerns. From a religious perspective the moral approach to 
assisted dying is shaped by notions of divine will – in this case the view that it would be 
sinful to oppose measures to alleviate suffering – as opposed to liberal notions of human 
rights deriving from the individual themselves. At the same time, however, we emphasise 
that, even if these findings show a bias in judgement about the specific form of arguments 
being used by the candidates, both religious and secular participants are reasoning together, 
and are not being divided by this bias.  
 
Figure 3 – How Participants View the Candidate’s Ideological Nature Hinges on 
Rhetoric, not the Participants’ Religious Identity. 
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Results – Taking Advice 
 The survey included an item that addresses whether participants would respond 
positively to information from the hypothetical candidate for public office or would remain 
closed off to it. More specifically, the question asked, “Other things being equal, I would take 
personal advice from Leslie Smith.” The offered response options ranged from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. Perhaps unsurprisingly, enthusiasm for taking advice from an 
adult in this sample population was tepid at best. In only one case (secular respondents 
supporting the secular, support candidate) did the level of support clear 5, the scale midpoint. 
Still, support was distinguishable among many groups in a similar pattern to previous 
analyses.5  
 
5 We also estimated a model of prospective vote support that strongly resembles this pattern. The results and a 
brief discussion of this are available in the Appendix (Figure A2).  
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Secular participants show the least support for the religious, oppose candidate, which 
is to be expected, but their support shows the same fealty to secular rhetoric as before. That 
is, among the two candidates who share the same position, support by secular participants for 
the candidate employing a religious argument is considerably lower. Their willingness to take 
advice from the oppose, secular candidate is numerically (but not statistically) ahead of the 
support, religious candidate. Religious participants, on the other hand, are indistinguishable 
from each other. There is some suggestion that they support legalising assisted dying more 
than they oppose it, since they show a slightly (but not statistically) higher willingness to take 
advice from the secular, support candidate than from the religious, oppose candidate. 
 
Figure 4 – Willingness to Take Personal Advice from the Candidate by Treatment and 
Religious Identity 
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Results – Religious Guidance 
It is possible (if remotely) that reading about candidates taking positions that people 
may disagree with can change their salient self-reports. As such, we sought to see whether the 
treatments had an effect on participant religiosity. This is not an ideal design, however, since 
we do not have prior reports to enable the documentation of individual change. Instead, we 
can only assess whether group means vary across the conditions. In an analysis of whether 
the respondent considers herself to be a religious person (strongly disagree to strongly agree), 
there is no variation across the conditions (controlling for gender and race – see Appendix 
Figure A1). However, there is one significant contrast in religious guidance levels between 
the two oppose conditions. Participants in the oppose, secular condition report lower levels of 
guidance (p=.03) compared to the oppose, religious condition. We don’t wish to make too 
much of this finding since it is not mirrored in other measures, but it does signal that people 
can be conservative without religion. Guidance in the oppose, secular condition is not 
distinguishable from the levels seen in either support condition. As a result, guidance was 
included in each of the other models to guard against mediating effects.  
 
Conclusion 
Scholars engaged in debates around the use of public reason typically contend that 
religious arguments should have no role in processes of democratic deliberation and that 
political discourse ought to take place using a form of language that all reasonable citizens 
can understand. This view is predicated upon various assumptions about the nature of 
religious argumentation, not least being that it amounts to some form of conversation stopper, 
effectively impeding the possibility of open democratic debate. The results of the study 
conducted here provide qualified empirical support for these assertions. They show that, 
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while religion is not the automatic bar to conversation that some have made it out to be, the 
use of religious discourse can nevertheless have a distorting effect on policy debates. There is 
widespread evidence sufficient to reject Hypothesis #1 that religious arguments are easily 
translatable and will have no distorting effects on public debate. 
One of the key findings affirms the close link between religious cues and the 
assumption of conservative attitudes. Both secular and religious participants perceived 
candidates taking a conservative stance on assisted dying (opposing legalisation) as being 
more likely to be religious, and saw candidates using religious rhetoric as being more likely 
to be conservative, even when they supported a liberal position (changing the law). Critically, 
however, this pattern does not appear to violate the concerns over public reason since the 
stereotype is employed by both groups across the identity divide. Distortions in policy 
debates linked to religion are not problematic as long as everyone understands the language 
cues in the same way. This supports Hypothesis #2.  
Similarly, candidates using religious rhetoric were seen to be more community 
focused and less concerned with promoting personal responsibility. Differences were also 
found in terms of the willingness of participants to vote for candidates based on their 
perceived religious views. Secular participants were more willing to vote for secular 
candidates and, conversely, less ready to vote for candidates using religious rhetoric, 
regardless of their policy views; the effects were much more muted for religious participants. 
This is a problem from a public reason perspective since secular participants are clearly 
rejecting views based on a stereotype. In contrast, religious participants were influenced more 
by the candidate’s views on the policy issue of assisted dying – the religious and secular cues 
made little difference to their candidate support (in support of Hypothesis #3). One way to 
read these results is that religious rhetoric can produce a dampening effect on public 
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responsiveness to policy positions, and that the use of a secular discourse is more likely to 
elicit a positive result since it is not rejected by the religious and is affirmed by the secular. 
These findings have clear implications for religious actors engaged in policy debates, 
but also for scholars engaged in debates around the use of public reason. Religious language 
is not considered to be wholly alien, but it has limited power to persuade. Moreover, religious 
cues produce distortions, but not always in ways consonant with identity conflict. In this 
sample, participants understood religion to stand for conservatism consistently across the key 
identity divide. Though not ideal from a deliberative perspective, it is arguably not a problem 
from a public reason perspective and this insight is a new one in this literature.  
It would be wrong to simply assume that religion is a conversation stopper, but further 
studies are needed into the real-world effects of secular and religious language across issue 
areas and differing national contexts. In particular, we need to understand the contexts in 
which religion’s involvement in public debate plays these different roles – as partner, as 
heuristic distorter, and as conversation stopper.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Sample Composition Statistics and Variable Coding 
 
Variable 
Sample 
Average Coding Range 
Female 54.1% [0=Men, 1=Women] 
White 66.3% [0=Non-white, 1=White] 
Political interest  3.11  
 
 
[1=Not interested, 4=Extremely 
interested] 
Ideology 2.7 
 
[1=very left wing, 5=very right wing] 
Religious guidance 
  
1.7 
  
 
[1=No guidance at all, 4=a great deal of 
guidance]  
Attendance 1.82 [1=rarely, if ever, 5=once a week] 
Religious Identification 
 
2.21 
 
[1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree] 
 
Religious groups should get 
involved in politics 2.13  [1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree]  
 
Variable Language 
Dependent Variables 
For the following questions, please circle the response between 0 and 10 that best fits 
your opinion. 
I believe that Leslie Smith, the candidate for Parliament pictured above is … 
Left-wing→ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right-wing 
 
Leslie Smith is a strong advocate for personal responsibility 
Disagree 
strongly→ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Agree 
strongly 
 
Other things equal, would you vote for Leslie Smith in an election? 
Not Vote 
for→ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Vote for 
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How religious is the candidate, Leslie Smith? 
Not 
religious→ 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very 
religious 
 
Independent Variables/Controls 
How much guidance does religion provide you in your daily life? 
(1) No guidance 
at all 
(2) some 
guidance 
(3) quite a bit of 
guidance 
(4) a great deal of guidance 
 
What is your 
race/ethnicity? 
(1) White (2) Black (3) Hispanic (4) Asian (5) Other 
• This was collapsed to 0=non-white, 1=white. 
 
What is your gender? (1) Female (0) Male  
 
Do you agree with this statement? I consider myself a ‘religious’ person 
(1) strongly 
agree 
(2) somewhat 
agree 
(3) neither agree nor 
disagree 
(4) somewhat 
disagree 
(5) strongly 
disagree 
• This was collapsed to 1:3= religious, 4:5=secular. 
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Table A2 – OLS Regression Results Used to Make Manuscript Tables  
(p values in parentheses) 
  
Religiosity 
 
Ideology 
Personal 
Responsibility 
Personal 
Advice 
(Intercept) 7.84 7.96 4.71 3.63  
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    
Reference – Religious::Oppose    
Secular::Oppose treatment -1.51  -2.16 1.51  -0.09     
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.03)    (0.89)    
Religious::Support treat. -2.31 -0.49     -0.16     0.17     
 (0.00)    (0.29)    (0.78)    (0.75)    
Secular::Support treatment -4.91 -2.43 2.10 0.47     
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.38)    
Secular::Oppose * Secular 0.63     -0.36     -0.16     2.33  
 (0.33)    (0.59)    (0.85)    (0.00)    
Religious::Support * Secular -0.74     -0.61     0.04     1.74   
 (0.19)    (0.30)    (0.95)    (0.01)    
Secular::Support * Secular -1.31   -0.92     0.75     3.02 
 (0.02)    (0.11)    (0.30)    (0.00)    
Secular 0.49     0.05     -0.37     -2.07 
 (0.26)    (0.92)    (0.51)    (0.00)    
White 0.28     0.16     -0.30     0.06     
 (0.23)    (0.51)    (0.31)    (0.84)    
Female 0.07     0.05     -0.37     -0.15     
 (0.69)    (0.78)    (0.09)    (0.46)    
Religious guidance 0.09     -0.52 0.03     0.20     
 (0.56)    (0.00)    (0.86)    (0.28)    
N 320        320        316        320        
R2 0.63     0.32     0.22     0.20     
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Figure A1 – Treatment Effects on Self-Reported Religious Identity and Religious 
Guidance 
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 Results – Vote Support  
While this is clearly hypothetical, the study also tried to gauge the extent to which 
participants would offer to vote for candidates if they had the opportunity. Notably, support 
for any candidate was tepid at best – see Figure A2. In a similar fashion to the results of the 
analysis of whether respondents would take personal advice from a candidate (see Figure 4 in 
the main text), there is only one case (secular respondents electing to vote for the secular, 
support candidate) in which the level of support clears the scale midpoint. The general 
pattern of vote support follows that presented by analyses discussed earlier.   
 
Figure A2 – Prospective Candidate Support by Treatment and Religious Identity 
 
 
